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Abstract
In this paper we consider the complexity of some problems arising in a fixed point model of trust in large-scale distributed
systems, based on the notion of trust structures introduced by Carbone, Nielsen and Sassone; a set of trust levels with two distinct
partial orderings. In the trust model, a global trust state exists as the least fixed point of a collection of local policy functions of
nodes in the network.
We first show that it is possible to efficiently compute a single component of the global trust state using a simple, robust
and totally asynchronous distributed algorithm. We complement this with a lower bound which shows that, if the policies are
unrestricted then communication and time linear in the number of distinct trust levels is required in the worst case.
We then consider the notion of distributed proof carrying requests previously introduced as a means of safely approximating the
global trust state without computing its exact value. We present a new result that enables us to give a continuum of proof carrying
protocols, the previously known protocol being one extreme of this. The theorem allows us to generate protocols that can prove all
possible trust values (previously, it was only possible to prove trust values representing ‘not too much bad behaviour’). However,
we show that such a general protocol may not be efficient — it is NP-hard to construct an approximately minimal size proof in
our model, and in the worst case the nodes must communicate almost as much data as if they were to compute the global trust
state from scratch. The implications of our negative results are that it may be necessary to restrict the policy language in order to
efficiently implement a fixed point model of trust in a distributed network.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The vision of global computing includes large-scale distributed, ubiquitous and autonomous systems. How best to
design a flexible security mechanism for a global computing system is not clear. The diversity and scale combined
with the lack of any centralized authority means that traditional security mechanisms such as access control lists,
are often too restrictive and complex to deploy [1]. The concept of trust management, introduced by Blaze et al. [2],
was presented as a solution to the problems with authorization in large-scale distributed systems. Traditional trust
management systems make security decisions based on policies, dealing with authorization by deciding the so-called
compliance checking problem: given a request to perform a certain action, together with a set of credentials, does the
request comply with the local security policy?
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While the traditional notion of trust management is well-understood, e.g. Mitchell et al. [3–5], and, to a large
extent, captured concisely in a mathematical framework of Weeks [6]; a lot of the “broader” dynamic systems lack
such foundation in formal methods (this point is illustrated by the wide range of related systems in the survey [7]). This
lack prompted the development of a mathematical framework for trust [8], inspired by that of Weeks, but departing
from Weeks by emphasizing the concept of information in contrast to authorization. The framework, which was
introduced by Carbone et al. [8], discussed also by Nielsen et al. [9] and Krukow [10], is the focus of this paper. In
this paper we present techniques for implementing this model in a large-scale distributed network, and consider some
more fundamental problems of complexity associated with fixed point models of trust.
1.1. The trust structure framework
A trust model should be generic enough to be instantiated to support authorization in a variety of distributed
computing systems. The trust structure framework [8] is a generic model, parameterized by a set X of possible trust
values representing distinct levels or degrees of trust, relevant for a particular application. The framework is aimed
at global computing environments, and is based on a domain-theoretic modeling of trust information. The goal is to
provide a unique global trust state for every set P of principal identities, each principal p ∈ P defining a trust policy
pip which quantifies for any principal identity q ∈ P the level of trust that p has in q.
Trust structures. In the framework, trust is something which exists between pairs of principals; it is quantified and
asymmetric in that we care of “how much” or “to what degree” principal p trusts principal q (which may not be
to the same degree that q trusts p). Each application instance of the framework defines a so-called trust structure,
T = (X,,v), which consists of a set X of trust values, together with two relations on X ; the trust ordering ()
and the information ordering (v). The elements s, t ∈ X express the levels of trust that are relevant for the particular
instance, and s  t means that t denotes at least as high a trust level as s. In contrast, the information ordering
introduces a notion of precision or information. The key idea is that the elements of X embody various degrees of
uncertainty. One may think of assertion x v y as the statement that x can be refined into y, or that x approximates y.
Definition 1 (Trust Structure). A trust structure is a triple T = (X,,v), consisting of a set X of trust values,
ordered by two binary relations:  ⊆ X × X called the trust ordering of T , and v ⊆ X × X called the
information ordering of T . The trust ordering is a preorder on X , meaning that it is reflexive and transitive, and the
information ordering makes (X,v) an ω-complete partial order with a least element, denoted⊥v. For anyv-ω-chain,
x0 v x1 v · · · , the least upper bound in (X,v) is denoted by⊔
i∈ω
xi .
In simple cases, the trust values are just symbolic, e.g. unknown v low  high, but they may also have more
internal structures. As a simple example of a trust structure, consider the so-called “MN” trust structure TMN [10].
In this structure, trust values are pairs (m, n) of (extended) natural numbers, representing m + n interactions with a
principal; each interaction classified as either “good” or “bad”. In a trust value (m, n), the first component, m, denotes
the number of “good” interactions, and the second, the number of “bad” ones. The information ordering is given by:
(m, n) v (m′, n′) only if one can refine (m, n) into (m′, n′) by adding zero or more good interactions, and, zero or
more bad interactions, i.e., iff m ≤ m′ and n ≤ n′. In contrast, the trust ordering is given by: (m, n)  (m′, n′) only if
m ≤ m′ and n ≥ n′. Nielsen et al. [11,8], have considered several additional examples of trust structures.
Trust policies. Given a fixed trust structure T = (X,,v), a global trust state of the system is a function
gts : P → P → X . The interpretation is that gts represents the trust state where p’s trust in q (formalized as
an element of X ) is given by gts(p)(q). The goal of the framework is to uniquely define a global trust state, denoted
gts. Each principal p ∈ P autonomously controls a trust policy, denoted pip, which then determines p’s trust within
the unique global trust state, i.e. gts(p).
Definition 2 (Trust Policy). Let T = (X,,v) be a trust structure. A trust policy in T , is a function pi : (P → P →
X)→ P → X , which is continuous with respect to the pointwise extension of v.1 This continuity property is called
information continuity.
1 We overload v (respectively ) to denote the pointwise extension of v () to the function space XP = P → X as well as to
(XP )P = P → P → X .
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In the simplest case, pip could be a constant function, ignoring its first argument gts : P → P → X . As an example,
pip(gts) = λq.t0 (for some t0 ∈ X ) defines p’s trust in any q ∈ P as the constant t0. In general, policy pip may refer to
other policies (piz , z ∈ P), and the general interpretation of pip is the following. Given that all principals assign trust
values as specified in the global trust state gts : P → P → X , then p assigns trust values as specified in function
pip(gts) : P → X . For example, function pip(gts) = λq ∈ P.(gts(A)(q) ∨ gts(B)(q)) ∧ medium, represents a
policy saying “for any q ∈ P , the trust in q is the least upper bound in (X,) of what A and B say, but no more
thanmedium ∈ X .” Such policy references are very similar to the concept of delegation, known from traditional trust
management.
Unique trust state. The collection of the trust policies of all principals, denoted Π = (pip : p ∈ P), thus “spins a
global web of trust” in which the trust policies mutually refer to each other. Since trust policies Π may give rise
to cyclic policy references, a crucial requirement is that the information ordering makes (X,v) a complete partial
order (cpo) with a bottom element. Since all policies are information-continuous, there exists a unique information-
continuous function Πλ =
〈
pip : p ∈ P
〉
, of type XPP → XPP with the property that Projp ◦ Πλ = pip for all
p ∈ P , where Projp is the pth projection.2 Since Πλ is information-continuous and (P → P → X,v) is a cpo with
a bottom element, Πλ has a (unique) least fixed point [12] which we denote lfpvΠλ (or simply lfpΠλ):
lfpvΠλ =
⊔
v
{Π iλ(λp.λq.⊥v) | i ∈ N}
(where
⊔
v means the least upper bound wrt the ordering v). Hence, for any collection of trust policies Π , we can
define the unique global trust state induced by that collection, as gts = lfpΠλ, which has the type of global trust
states, P → P → X . This unique trust state thus satisfies the following fixed point equation:
∀p ∈ P. m(p) = Projp(m)
= Projp(Πλ(m)) (since Πλ(m) = m)
= pip(m).
Reading this from the left to the right, any function m : P → P → X satisfying this equation is consistent with
the policies (pip | p ∈ P), i.e. any fixed point of Πλ is consistent with all policies pip. Consider now two mutually
referring functions pip and piq , given by pip = λm.Projq(m), and piq = λm.Projp(m). Intuitively, there is no
information present in these functions; p delegates all trust questions to q and similarly q delegates to p. In this case,
we would like the global trust state gts induced by the functions to take the value ⊥v on any entry z ∈ P for both
p and q , i.e., for both x = p and x = q and for all z ∈ P we should have gts(x)(z) = ⊥v. This is exactly what is
obtained by choosing the information-least fixed point of Πλ. We summarize this as a definition.
Definition 3 (Global Trust State). Let T = (X,,v) be a trust structure, P a set of principal identities, and
Π = (pip | p ∈ P) be a collection of trust policies in T , indexed by the principal identities. Let Πλ =
〈
pip | p ∈ P
〉
.
The global trust state induced by Π , denoted gts, is given by
gts = lfpvΠλ.
1.2. The operational problem
Many interesting systems are instances of the trust structure framework [8,10], but one could argue against its
usefulness as a basis for the actual construction of trust management systems. In order to make security decisions,
each principal p will need to reason about its trust in others, that is, the values of gts(p). While the framework does
ensure the existence of a unique (mathematically well-founded) global trust state, it is not “operational” in the sense
of providing a way for principals to actually compute the trust values. Furthermore, as we shall argue in the following,
the standard way of computing least fixed points is inadequate in our scenario.
When the cpo (X,v) is of finite height h, the cpo (P → P → X,v) has height |P|2 · h.3 In this case, the
least fixed point of Πλ can, in principle, be computed by finding the first identity in the chain of approximants
2 Projp is given by: for all m : P → P → X . Projp(m) = m(p).
3 The height of a cpo is the size of its longest chain.
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(λp.λq.⊥v) v Πλ(λp.λq.⊥v) v Π 2λ (λp.λq.⊥v) v · · · v Π |P |
2·h
λ (λp.λq.⊥v) [12]. However, in the environment
envisioned, such a computation is infeasible. The functions (pip : p ∈ P) defining Πλ are distributed throughout the
network, and, more importantly, even if the height h is finite, the number of principals |P|, though finite, will be very
large. Furthermore, even if resources were available to make this computation, we cannot assume that any central
authority is present to perform it. Finally, since each principal p defines its trust policy pip autonomously, an inherent
problem with trying to compute the fixed point is the fact that p might decide to change its policy pip to pi ′p at any
time. Such a policy update would be likely to invalidate data obtained from a fixed point computation done with global
function Πλ, i.e., one might not have time to compute lfpΠλ before the policies have changed to Π ′.
The above discussion indicates that exact computation of the fixed point is infeasible, and hence that the framework
is not suitable as an operational model. Our motivation is to counter this by showing that the situation is not as hopeless
as suggested. The rest of the paper presents a collection of techniques for approximating the idealized state lfpΠλ.
1.3. Contributions
We build on the formal fixed point model of trust presented in [8] by giving algorithmic techniques for efficient
distributed computation of approximations to the idealized trust values. In addition we give several important negative
results that suggest worthwhile future directions in this area.
The above details show that the notion of delegation, or policy reference, is crucial to fixed point models of trust,
and in particular, the existence of delegation cycles. However, this introduces additional complexity in that the policies
may interact. Since the policies are distributed throughout the network, it is important to understand the complexity
of these interactions when one wishes to compute a portion of the global trust state. Until now, very little has been
known about the complexity of these interactions, and what sorts of policies induce complex interactions.
We start by showing that although it may be infeasible to compute the global trust state, one can instead try to
compute the so-called local fixed point values. We take the realistic view that there is some specific principal, wanting
to reason about its trust value for some other principal. The basic idea is that instead of computing the entire state and
then looking up the desired value, one may instead compute this value directly. We prove our results in an abstract
model that removes most of the additional complexity associated with the trust model scenario. In the abstract model,
there is a graph of n nodes where each has an associated function fi , the collection of these functions gives a global
function F = ( f1, . . . , fn) and we wish to compute the i th component of the fixed point of F , denoted by f ∗i . This
model naturally models computation in boolean networks and may be useful in many other contexts.
We prove a convergence result that enables us to apply a robust totally asynchronous distributed algorithm of
Bertsekas [13] for local fixed point computation in this abstract model. This is developed in Section 2. We complement
the above by proving a lower bound on the communication complexity of any distributed algorithm to compute a
single component of the global trust state. Since our lower bound in proved in the abstract model, the technique used
to establish it may be of independent interest.
We also develop the notion of ‘proof carrying requests’ by presenting a new result that gives proof carrying
protocols that can be used for all trust values (previously, it was only known how to prove trust values representing
‘not too much bad behaviour’). However, we show that, unfortunately, such a general proof carrying protocol may not
be efficient — in some cases it is NP-hard to construct an approximately minimal size proof, and in the worst case the
nodes must communicate at least as much data as if they were computing the global trust state from scratch.
The implication of our negative results is that it may be necessary to restrict the policy language in order to
efficiently implement the trust model in a distributed network. We have been unable to obtain interesting results in
this area but it remains an interesting area for future work.
1.4. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a distributed algorithm and prove its
correctness in a totally asynchronous network. In Section 3 we prove a lower bound on the complexity of computing
least fixed points in networks when the policies are unrestricted. Section 4 presents the new proof carrying request
techniques, and in Section 5 we use the lower bounds of Section 3 to show a negative result on the complexity of proof
carrying request protocols.
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2. Distributed computation of local least fixed points
In this section, we show how to compute the local fixed point value gts(R)(q) for two fixed principals R and q,
without computing the complete global trust state gts. The reason for computing local values is two-fold. First, we can
benefit from distributing the computational and storage burdens, so that instead of centrally computing the complete
state gts, node R will maintain “entry” gts(R)(q) in the “distributed matrix” gts. Second, although the semantics of
trust policies are functions of the type (P → P → X)→ P → X which (due to policy referencing) in general may
depend on the trust values of all principals, we expect that in practice, policies will not be written in this way. Instead,
policies are likely to refer to a few known (and usually “trusted”) principals. For fixed R and q, the set of principals
that R’s policy actually depends on in its entry for q , is often a significantly smaller subset ofP . For example, consider
our policy from the previous section.
piR(gts) = λq ∈ P.(gts(A)(q) ∨ gts(B)(q)) ∧ medium.
This policy is independent of all entries of gts except for those of principals A and B. This means that in order to
evaluate piR with respect to some principal q , R needs only information from A and B.
We first compute (distributedly) a dependency graph which contains only the dependencies relevant for the
computation of gts(R)(q), thus excluding the set of principals that do not need to be involved in computation. We
then proceed with the computation of gts(R)(q) by showing that the conditions of a general algorithmic convergence
theorem of Bertsekas [13] are satisfied, and hence we can appeal to known convergence results.
2.1. The abstract problem
We now describe the abstract model in which we shall prove our main results, and describe how the trust model
problem is translated to this model. Although the results can be interpreted in the trust model setting, it is much easier
to simply work in the abstract domain.
Let (X,v) be a cpo of finite height h and given some collection F = ( f1, . . . , fn) of monotone functions
fi : Xn → X , build a network G of processors where processor i has associated with it function fi , and edges in the
network represent the dependencies between the functions — the edge (i, j) is present iff function fi depends on the
variable x j . It follows that the unique function F : Xn → Xn satisfying F = 〈 f1, f2, . . . , fn〉 is also monotone and
so has a unique least fixed point which we denote by F∗ = ( f ∗1 , . . . , f ∗n ) ∈ Xn . Fix some special node r ∈ {1 . . . n},
called the root node. Then the problem is for r to compute f ∗r .
We use an asynchronous communication model, assuming no known bound on the time it takes for a sent
message to arrive. We assume that there exists some underlying protocol for sending messages between nodes with
the following properties: communication is reliable in the sense that any message sent arrives exactly once to the
destination node and that messages arrive in the order in which they are sent by a node (although messages from
different nodes can be interleaved). More details on asynchronous models of communication can be found in [13].
We translate the trust structure setting into the abstract setting of the network model as follows. The n nodes of the
network are labelled by pairs xy for x, y ∈ P . The node xy will be responsible for computing approximations to the
value gts(x)(y), i.e., x’s trust value for y. Since we are interested in a specific principal R’s trust value for q, the root
node is the node with label Rq . However, we only want to consider the nodes xy that are relevant for computing the
value gts(R)(q), and hence, not all labels appear in the network (i.e., n  |P|2).
The nodes that actually appear in the network (and their mutual dependencies) can be efficiently determined by a
simple distributed spanning tree algorithm, assuming that each principal x knows the dependencies of its own policy
pix . For each node i = xy in the network, the function fi associated with that node is the entry for y in x’s policy, i.e.,
the projection Projy ◦ pix . The technical report [14] contains an asynchronous distributed algorithm to construct the
dependency graph.
Note that, this translation might lead to a principal, say p, appearing several times in the dependency graph,
e.g., as nodes py and pz for y 6= z. We shall think of these as distinct nodes in the graph, although a concrete
implementation would have principal p playing the role of both nodes (e.g., both of the abstract operations of sending
a message to py and sending a message to pz would be implemented as sending messages to principal p in the physical
communication network). Note also, that the dependency graph is not modeling any network topology. Although the
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nodes of the graph represent concrete nodes in a physical communication network, its edges do not represent any
particular communication links.
From now on, we shall work in the abstract setting as it simplifies notation. Note that this translation might lead to
a node z appearing several times in the dependency graph, e.g. with entries for principalsw and y in piz . We shall think
of these as distinct nodes in the graph, although a concrete implementation would have node z playing the role of two
nodes, zw and zy . Note also, that the (minimal) dependency graph is not modeling any network topology. Although
the nodes of the graph represent concrete nodes in a physical communication network, its edges do not represent any
communication links.
2.2. An asynchronous algorithm
Assume that the dependency graph has already been computed, and each node i knows two sets: N+(i), the set
of variables (nodes) on which the function fi depends, and N−(i), the set of nodes whose policy depends on i . We
shall show that this gives a situation in which we can apply the existing work of Bertsekas for distributed computation
of the least fixed point. Bertsekas has a class of algorithms, called totally asynchronous (TA) iterative fixed point
algorithms, and a general theorem which gives conditions ensuring that a specific TA fixed point algorithm will
converge to the desired result. In our case, “converge to” means that each principal i ∈ P will compute a sequence of
values⊥v = i.t0 v i.t1 v · · · v i.tk = f ∗i . The general theorem is called the “Asynchronous Convergence Theorem”
(ACT), and we use this name to refer to Proposition 6.2.1 of [13]. The ACT applies in any scenario in which the
Synchronous Convergence Condition (SCC) and the Box Condition (BC) are satisfied. Intuitively, the synchronous
convergence condition states that if the algorithm is executed synchronously, then one obtains the desired result. In
our case, this amounts to requiring that the “synchronous” sequence ⊥v v F(⊥v) v · · · converges to the least fixed
point F∗, which is true. Intuitively, the box condition requires that one can split the set of possible values appearing
during synchronous computation into a product (“box”) of sets of values that appear locally at each node in the
asynchronous computation. As a consequence of v-monotonicity of the policies, the conditions of the Asynchronous
Convergence Theorem are satisfied (the following Proposition 7), and so, we can deploy a totally asynchronous
distributed algorithm.
We now describe the algorithm and argue for its correctness. We will assume that each node i allocates variables
i.tcur and i.told of type X , which will later record the “current” value and the last computed value in X . Each node i
has also an array, denoted by i.m. The array i.m is of type X array, and will be indexed by the set N+(i). Initially,
i.tcur = i.told = ⊥v, and the array is also initialized with ⊥v. For any nodes i and j ∈ N+(i), when i receives a
message from j (which is always a value t ∈ X ), it stores this message in i.m[ j].
The algorithm. The algorithm is very simple — any node is always in one of two states: sleep or wake. All nodes
start in the wake state, and if a node is in the sleep state, the reception of a message triggers a transition to the wake
state.
In the wake state each node i asynchronously repeats i.tcur← fi (i.m). If there is no change in the value of fi (i.m)
(compared to the last value i.told), it goes to the sleep state unless a message was received since fi (i.m)was computed.
If told 6= fi (i.m) then fi (i.m) is sent to all the nodes in N−(i).
Concurrently with this we can run a termination detection algorithm, which will detect when all nodes are in the
sleep state and no messages are in transit. Bertsekas has already addressed this problem with his termination detection
algorithm [13], which directly applies, yielding only a constant overhead in the message complexity.
Asynchronous convergence theorem. We recall the definition of the Synchronous Convergence Condition (SCC)
and the Box Condition (BC) (Section 6.2 [13]). Let X be any set, and F : Xn → Xn be any function with
F = 〈 f1, f2, . . . , fn〉.
Definition 4 (SCC and BC). Let {X (k)}∞k=0 be a sequence of subsets X (k) ⊆ Xn satisfying ∀k.X (k + 1) ⊆ X (k).
SCC. The sequence {X (k)}∞k=0 satisfies the Synchronous Convergence Condition if
∀x ∈ X (k).F(x) ∈ X (k + 1)
and furthermore, if {yk}k∈ω is a sequence with yk ∈ X (k) for all k, then every limit point of {yk}k∈ω is a fixed
point of F .
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BC. The sequence {X (k)}∞k=0 satisfies the Box Condition if for every k, there exist sets X i (k) ⊆ X such that
X (k) =
n∏
i=1
X i (k).
We state a version of the Asynchronous Convergence Theorem that matches our notation. We need some preliminary
terminology. Assume that before starting the asynchronous algorithm, the arrays of the nodes are initialized with a
vector x¯ ∈ Xn , called the initial solution estimate. That is, for all nodes i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all j ∈ N+(i) assume that
i.m[ j] = x¯ j and that i.told = x¯i .
A limit point of the asynchronous algorithm (with initial estimate x¯) is a vector xˆ ∈ Xn which can be written
xˆi = i.tcur, where there exists some state of the distributed system in which the algorithm has converged, and i.tcur
is the current value of node i in this state (the algorithm has converged when all nodes are in the sleep state, and no
messages are in transit).
Theorem 5 (ACT [13]). Assume there exists a sequence of subsets X (k) ⊆ Xn with ∀k.X (k + 1) ⊆ X (k), satisfying
the SCC and the BC. Assume that the arrays of the nodes are initialized with x¯ ∈ X (0), called the initial solution
estimate. Then every limit point of the asynchronous algorithm is a fixed point of F.
The ACT ensures that the algorithm converges to a fixed point of F under asynchronous computation. The algorithm
computes X (0), X (1), . . . as a sequence of approximations ordered by the information ordering v. Therefore, we set
X (0) to be any v-approximation to the v-least fixed point of F , such as the ‘bottom’ vector (⊥v,⊥v, . . .)
2.3. Correctness
To prove the correctness of the asynchronous algorithm, we shall show that the assumption of the ACT is satisfied
when all nodes initialize their trust values (i.m and i.told) to ⊥v, and that any limit point of the algorithm is the least
fixed point of F . The following concept of an information approximation is central.
Definition 6 (Information Approximation). Let F : Xn → Xn be continuous. Say that a value t¯ ∈ Xn , is an
information approximation for F if t¯ v F∗ and t¯ v F(t¯).
The following Proposition 7 shows that we can indeed appeal to the ACT. In the following (X,v) is a finite height
cpo, and F : Xn → Xn is continuous.
Proposition 7 (Correctness). Let t¯ be any information approximation for F. Assume that the arrays of the nodes
are initialized with t¯ . Then there exists a decreasing sequence {X (k)} of subsets of Xn with t¯ ∈ X (0), satisfying the
synchronous convergence condition and the box condition. Furthermore, any limit point of the asynchronous algorithm
with initial estimate t¯ is F∗.
Proof. Define a sequence of subsets of Xn , X (0) ⊇ X (1) ⊇ · · · ⊇ X (k) ⊇ X (k + 1) ⊇ · · · by
X (k) = {m ∈ Xn | Fk(t¯ ) v m v F∗}.
Note that X (k + 1) ⊆ X (k) follows from the fact that Fk(t¯ ) v Fk+1(t¯ ) for any k ∈ N, which, in turn, holds since t¯
is an information approximation. For the synchronous convergence condition, assume that m ∈ X (k) for some k ∈ N.
Since Fk(t¯) v m v F∗, we get by monotonicity Fk+1(t¯ ) v F(m) v F(F∗) = F∗. Let (yk)k∈ω be such that
yk ∈ X (k) for every k.
Since t¯ is an information approximation, we have
⊔
i F
i (t¯ ) = F∗. Since X is of finite height there exists kh ∈ N
so that for all k′ ≥ kh , X (k′) = F∗. Thus any such (yk)k∈ω converges to F∗. The box condition is also easy to show:
X (k) =
n∏
i=1
{m(i) ∈ X | m ∈ Xn and Fk(t¯ ) v m v F∗}. 
To prove the correctness of our algorithm, we simply invoke Proposition 7 in the case of the trivial information
approximation t¯ = ⊥nv. The asynchronous convergence theorem ensures that the asynchronous algorithm converges
towards the right values at all nodes, and, because of our assumption of finite height cpos, the distributed system will
eventually reach a state which is stable. In this state, each node i will have computed f ∗i .
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Fig. 1. Example dependency graph.
2.4. Communication requirements
Since any node sends values only when a change occurs, by monotonicity of fi , node i will send at most h · |N−(i)|
messages, each of size O(log |X |) bits.4 Node i will receive at most h · |N+(i)| messages, each message (possibly)
triggering a computation of fi . Globally, the number of messages is O(h · |E |) each of bit size O(log |X |). Hence,
the communication complexity of our algorithm is linear in the height of the lattice used by the policies. An important
global invariant in this algorithm is that any value computed locally at a node (by the assignment i.tcur ← fi (i.m)) is
a component in an information approximation for F . That is, it holds everywhere, at any time, that (1) i.tcur v f ∗i and
(2) i.tcur v fi (i.m). To see this, note that (1, 2) hold initially, and that both the properties are preserved by the update
i.tcur ← fi (i.m) whenever i.m[y] v f ∗y for all y ∈ N+(i) (which is always true). We state this fact as a lemma, as it
becomes very useful in the next section where we consider fixed point approximation algorithms.
Lemma 8. Any value i.tcur ∈ X computed by any node i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, at any time in the algorithm by the statement
i.tcur← fi (i.m), is a part of an information approximation for F, in the sense that i.tcur v f ∗i and i.told v i.tcur.
2.5. An example computation
In this subsection, we give a small example of a run of the asynchronous algorithm. Let us consider an example
with 5 principals, named R,A,B,C and D. The example is meant to illustrate the situation where R wants to compute
its trust value in a certain fixed subject S (which will not be involved in the computation). We will use the MN trust
structure TMN (Section 1) in the example.
Policies. The policies of the principals have the following entries for S.
piR = (pAq(S) ∨ pCq(S)) unionsq Loc(S)
piA = pBq(S) unionsq Loc(S)
piB = pRq(S) unionsq Loc(S)
piC = pDq(S) unionsq Loc(S)
piD = pCq(S) unionsq Loc(S).
The construct p·q is policy reference (as in Section 4.1), ∨ is-join and unionsq isv-join. The construct Loc(S) is a special
construct for the TMN trust structure; it refers to the trust value derived from the local observations made by a principal
about the subject in question (this construct is discussed also by Nielsen and Krukow [11]). For example, R’s policy
for the subject is to take the -join in TMN of the values that A and C specify for the subject, and then the v-join of
this value and the trust value given by the local observations made by R about the subject.
It is not hard to see that both (TMN ,) and (TMN ,v) are lattices, and that the joins are given by the following
formulas; for any (m, n), (m′, n′) ∈ TMN we have:
(m, n) ∨ (m′, n′) = (max(m,m′),min(n, n′))
(m, n) unionsq (m′, n′) = (max(m,m′),max(n, n′)).
The dependency graph derived from the policies is given in Fig. 1.
Local data. We assume that the principals have the following local data, representing observations made about the
subject.
4 In fact, there will be only O(h) different messages, each sent to all of N−(i). Consequently, a broadcast mechanism could implement the
message delivery efficiently.
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R A B C D
Loc(S) (0, 0) (1, 5) (3, 0) (2, 5) (4, 6)
The synchronous computation. Let us first illustrate the least fixed point of the policies by showing the sequence
of computations corresponding to the “synchronous” iterations (i.e., ⊥v,Πλ(⊥v),Πλ(Πλ(⊥v)), . . .). In the table
below, column x of row i + 1 is obtained by applying policy pix to row i , e.g., the value (3, 5) in column A of row 2
is obtained by the following informal “calculation”
pBq(S) unionsq Loc(S) = (3, 0) unionsq (1, 5) = (3, 5).
It is easy to verify that the last row in the table below is the least fixed point of the policies (i.e., iterating round 6 will
give the same row as iteration 5).
Iteration R A B C D
0 ⊥v ⊥v ⊥v ⊥v ⊥v
1 (0, 0) (1, 5) (3, 0) (2, 5) (4, 6)
2 (2, 5) (3, 5) (3, 0) (4, 6) (4, 6)
3 (4, 5) (3, 5) (3, 5) (4, 6) (4, 6)
4 (4, 5) (3, 5) (4, 5) (4, 6) (4, 6)
5 (4, 5) (4, 5) (4, 5) (4, 6) (4, 6)
An asynchronous run. We now show a possible run of the asynchronous algorithm for the same set of policies as
above. We illustrate the algorithm by showing the local states of the nodes in the network at various points in time.
The nodes are denoted by boxes describing the local state in terms of values of arrays i.m, and the values of i.tcur.
Furthermore, messages that are in transit are visible on the “dependency” edges between the nodes. Note that messages
“flow against” the direction of the arrowhead since arrows denote dependencies.
Network snapshot 1. We assume that the initial states of the nodes are given by the following. All nodes are wake,
the arrays (i.m) are initialized to ⊥v = (0, 0). Each node has i.tcur = pii (i.m).
R : wake
R.tcur = (0, 0)
m[A] = (0, 0)
m[C] = (0, 0)

-- C : wake
C.tcur = (2, 5)
m[D] = (0, 0)

A : wake
A.tcur = (1, 5)
m[B] = (0, 0) 11
B : wake
B.tcur = (3, 0)
m[R] = (0, 0)
cc
D : wake
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (0, 0)
KK
Network snapshot 2. Here R has received value (1, 5) from A and (2, 5) from C. Further values are in transit, e.g.
value R : (2, 5) “on” edge B→ R represents a message in transit from R to B.
R : sleep
R.tcur = (2, 5)
m[A] = (1, 5)
m[C] = (2, 5)

-- C : sleep
C.tcur = (2, 5)
m[D] = (0, 0)
D:(4,6)

A : sleep
A.tcur = (1, 5)
m[B] = (0, 0)
B:(3,0)
11
B : sleep
B.tcur = (3, 0)
m[R] = (0, 0)
R:(2,5)cc
D : sleep
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (0, 0)
C:(2,5)
KK
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Network snapshot 3. Two messages are in transit on the (presumably slow) path from C to D (we are assuming a
reliable network, so the first sent will also arrive first). B has just finished computing piB(B.m) = (3, 5), but
has not yet sent this value.
R : sleep
R.tcur = (2, 5)
m[A] = (1, 5)
m[C] = (2, 5)
A:(3,5)

C:(4,6)
-- C : sleep
C.tcur = (4, 6)
m[D] = (4, 6)

A : sleep
A.tcur = (3, 5)
m[B] = (3, 0) 11
B : wake
B.tcur = (3, 5)
m[R] = (2, 5)
cc
D : sleep
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (0, 0)
C:(4,6);
C:(2,5)
KK
Network snapshot 4.
R : sleep
R.tcur = (3, 5)
m[A] = (3, 5)
m[C] = (2, 5)

C:(4,6)
-- C : sleep
C.tcur = (4, 6)
m[D] = (4, 6)

A : sleep
A.tcur = (3, 5)
m[B] = (3, 5) 11
B : sleep
B.tcur = (3, 5)
m[R] = (2, 5)
R:(3,5)cc
D : sleep
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (2, 5)
C:(4,6)
KK
Network snapshot 5. Notice that the component consisting of C and D has converged. No more messages are
exchanged between them for the remainder of the algorithm; this is in contrast to the globally synchronous
iteration.
R : sleep
R.tcur = (4, 5)
m[A] = (3, 5)
m[C] = (4, 6)

-- C : sleep
C.tcur = (4, 6)
m[D] = (4, 6)

A : sleep
A.tcur = (3, 5)
m[B] = (3, 5) 11
B : sleep
B.tcur = (3, 5)
m[R] = (3, 5)
R:(4,5)cc
D : sleep
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (4, 6)
KK
Network snapshot 6.
R : sleep
R.tcur = (4, 5)
m[A] = (3, 5)
m[C] = (4, 6)

-- C : sleep
C.tcur = (4, 6)
m[D] = (4, 6)

A : sleep
A.tcur = (3, 5)
m[B] = (3, 5)
B:(4,5)
11
B : sleep
B.tcur = (4, 5)
m[R] = (4, 5)
cc
D : sleep
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (4, 6)
KK
Network snapshot 7. When R receives the final value from A, the algorithm has converged.
R : sleep
R.tcur = (4, 5)
m[A] = (3, 5)
m[C] = (4, 6)
A:(4,5)

-- C : sleep
C.tcur = (4, 6)
m[D] = (4, 6)

A : sleep
A.tcur = (4, 5)
m[B] = (4, 5) 11
B : sleep
B.tcur = (4, 5)
m[R] = (4, 5)
cc
D : sleep
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (4, 6)
KK
3. Lower bounds
In this section we show a lower bound for the communication involved in the problem tackled in the previous
section. The model is as described in Section 2.1, and in addition we assume that all processors have unlimited
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computational power. The communication complexity of a protocol in a distributed network is the number of bits sent
in total, over all edges of the network, in the worst case. For simplicity, we shall first consider the case where the cpo
is the boolean lattice X = (0 v 1).
As stated in Section 2, the aim of the distributed algorithm is to compute local fixed points without computing the
global state, if possible. Therefore in this section we consider the problem of computing a single component f ∗i of
the lfp, rather than entire least fixed point F∗. Achieving good lower bounds for this appears to be a tricky problem.
The algorithm of Section 2 uses O(n2) bits, and on the other hand, the trivial Ω(n) lower bound (by noting that some
node must receive n bits to merely evaluate its function) does not capture the possible combinatorial nature of the
interactions between the local policy functions.
3.1. Lower bound technique
We obtain a lower bound by considering a two-party version of the problem: partition the set of functions (nodes
of the network) between two players, Alice and Bob. Alice knows all the functions in her partition and Bob knows all
the functions in his partition. The number of bits that Alice and Bob must communicate for one of them to know the
result is clearly a lower bound on the total communication incurred by any totally distributed algorithm.
Our result makes use of the set-disjointness problem: Alice and Bob each have a set, drawn from {1, . . . , r} and
they must decide if their sets are disjoint. It is known that any protocol for this problem must communicate at least
Ω(r) bits in the worst case, even if Alice and Bob are to know the result with probability at least 2/3, i.e. a randomized
protocol. A proof of this result can be found in [15], along with more details about the communication complexity
model.
We can achieve a lower bound on our two-party problem by constructing a reduction from the set-disjointness
problem: given two sets P, Q ⊆ {1, . . . , r}, construct a set of functions f1 . . . fn/2 for Alice using only knowledge of
P and a set of functions fn/2+1 . . . fn for Bob using only knowledge of Q such that knowing the least fixed point of
the function F = ( f1, . . . , fn) allows Alice or Bob to decide disjointness of P and Q (clearly once one player knows
the result, the other can be informed with one extra bit of communication).
Lemma 9. Given two sets P, Q ⊆ {1, . . . , r} for some number r = log n!, there exists a pair of monotone
boolean circuits 〈 f1, . . . , fs〉 and 〈 fs+1, . . . , fs+t 〉 where fi : {0, 1}s+t → {0, 1} and s, t = O(n). Letting
F = 〈 f1, . . . , fs+t 〉, then for some i ∈ {1, . . . , s + t}, f ∗i = 1 iff P and Q are disjoint.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from set-disjointness. Consider some permutation σ of {0, . . . , n− 1}. We can view
σ as a set of size
∑n
i=1 lg i = lg n! ≈ n lg n − n bits by partitioning it into blocks of length lg n, lg(n − 1), . . . , 1
bits where each block representing a binary expansion of some integer k has the meaning ‘select the kth element
not yet selected’. For example, the permutation (0, 1, . . . , n − 1) corresponds to the empty set, and the permutation
(n−1, n−2, . . . , 0) corresponds to the complement of the empty set. We will encode σ by revealing one bit at a time.
We will use the notation σ(i) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} to denote the i th element of the permutation, and σi ∈ {0, 1}lg n−i to
denote the binary expansion of σ(i). From now on we shall use σ, σ ′ to denote the two sets P, Q respectively.
The reduction proceeds as follows. Since the function F = ( f1, . . . , fs+t ) is monotone, F∗ exists and is unique.
Hence we can simulate the network by computing 0, F(0), . . . to find F∗ and since F∗ is unique, any algorithm must
also reach this same final state. The idea is that after the kth iteration, the value of F (k)(0) will reveal disjointness of
the sets
⋃k
i=0 σi and
⋃k
i=0 σ ′i . We now show how such a network can be realised.
Define the symmetric k-threshold function as Thk(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 iff x1, . . . , xn contains a subset of size k. Note
that with
(n
k
) {∧,∨}-gates we can construct the formula
Thk(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∨
i1=1
· · ·
n∨
ik=1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i1<i2<···<ik
(
k∧
j=1
xi j
)
and note that Th0 = 1. The permutation σ (and hence the set P) can be encoded into Alice’s functions as follows.
There are s = 2n functions: set fi ≡ Thσ(i−1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and fi ≡ Thσ(i−1)+1 for n ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Now we describe how to build Bob’s functions, given the permutation σ ′ representing the set Q. The i th function
fs+i outputs 1 iff the sets σi−1 and σ ′i−1 are disjoint, and these sets are revealed by Alice on the i th iteration. Bob can
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Fig. 2. The dependency graph for the lower bound construction.
compute a set of functions as follows: let Si be the set of indices such that if σ(i) ∈ Si then σi ∩σ ′i = ∅. The functions
can detect the value of σ(i) by comparing the outputs of Alice’s functions on the previous iteration with the current
outputs, and seeing which bit has been raised (recall that we encode σ(i − 1) = j on the i th iteration by raising the
j th nonzero bit of the outputs).
Let Bob’s functions take as input x1 . . . xn, y1, . . . , yn , the current output of Alice’s functions where (by
construction) the second half of this string is the same as the first half on the previous iteration. Then Bob can detect
which bit was raised by comparing the two halves. Since we are restricted to monotone functions, we cannot simply use
a difference operator, instead the i th function can have a disjunction over the possible substrings of the input that would
encode a σ(i − 1) that was also in the set Si−1. We shall denote by s j1 . . . s jk the indices of the j th possible substring
that would satisfy the condition on the kth iteration, i.e. the input should satisfy xs j1 ∧ . . .∧ xs jk ∧ ys j1 ∧ . . .∧ ys j,k−1 .
Bob’s functions can then be written as:
fs+1 =
∨
j
xs j1
fs+2 =
∨
j
(
xs j1 ∧ xs j2 ∧ ys j1
)
fs+3 =
∨
j
(
xs j1 ∧ xs j2 ∧ xs j3 ∧ ys j1 ∧ ys j2
)
... fs+n .
The circuits are connected together by connecting the outputs of Bob’s functions to be the inputs of Alice’s functions,
and vice versa. This gives the dependency graph of Fig. 2.
Now, all the counter-examples to the disjointness of P, Q lie in the region strictly between 0 and 1. We now
claim that Bob can compute disjointness by knowing f ∗j for some single component j . More precisely, we claim that
f ∗s+1 ∧ . . . ∧ f ∗s+n = 1 iff the sets P, Q are disjoint. In fact, this is quite easy to see by considering what happens as
one applies the functions, starting from the all-zero vector 0: after k iterations of F , the outputs of Alice’s functions
encode the set σk and the output of Bob’s functions is 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
0 . . . 0 iff the sets
⋃k
i=0 σi and
⋃k
i=0 σ ′i are disjoint. The
claim then follows by considering the outputs at the (s + t)th iteration, and noting that after this many iterations there
can be no changes in the outputs so it must also be the least fixed point. 
Since the conjunction f ∗s+1 ∧ . . . ∧ f ∗s+n can be computed by a single node say f0, and since any monotone function
has a monotone circuit computing it, the main result follows: any protocol that terminates with some node knowing
f ∗0 with probability p can be used to solve the set-disjointness problem on sets of size Ω(n log n) with probability p.
Therefore any protocol that solves our problem, even with probability greater than 2/3, must communicate at least
Ω(n log n) bits across the cut between Alice and Bob.
A two-party upper bound. In the two-party case, the obvious iterative algorithm is optimal. Suppose each party A, B
has a monotone function fA, fB : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}n . Let a0 = b0 = 0. Party A starts by sending a1 = fA(a0b0) to
B, then B computes b1 = fB(a0b0), and sends to A the set of indices of the bits that changed in b1. This continues
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until there is no change in either ai or bi , in which case aibi = F∗. Since there can be no more than 2n iterations, this
protocol communicates O(n log n) bits.
3.2. A lower bound for lattices of arbitrary height
We can now state the main result of this section by extending the boolean lower bound to functions on more general
partial orders X of height h, as is the case with the trust structure model. Here the difference between the trivial lower
bound and ours is significant: the trivial lower bound (for a processor to evaluate its function) is Ω(n log h) bits and
we now prove an Ω(nh log n) lower bound. Thus, the communication must grow linearly with the lattice height, in
the worst case.
The lower bound can be extended by considering how many ways the nodes can count by monotonically changing
the bits on outputs to edges on the cut. This is illustrated by the following problem. We have hn balls (representing the
maximum number of steps) and n bins (representing the outputs) each of capacity h (since we can assign h different
values to each output). At each step, we throw a ball into an unfilled bin (this corresponds to the fact that we must
change at least one output at each step). The question is how many different ways can we throw the balls into the
bins? For our result we are only interested in the logarithm of this number, which is quite easy to bound as follows.
An upper bound can be obtained by assuming that every ball has a choice of n bins (i.e. they do not fill up); then the
order taken by the balls gives log nhn = hn log n bits of information. A lower bound can be obtained by assuming that
the first h balls each have a choice of n bins, the second h only have n − 1 choices, and so on. This way, the order
that the balls are assigned to bins gives log nh(n − 1)h · · · 1h = h log n! ≈ h(n log n − n) bits of information. But
asymptotically these are equal, so the correct bound must be Θ(hn log n) bits.
The relationship to the lower bound is as follows. Recall that the sets are encoded by considering the number of
distinct ways of raising the outputs of Alice’s functions. When the functions are boolean, there are exactly n! ways
of doing this, which gives the lower bound of log n! ≈ n log n. With h different possible output values for each node,
the above analogy gives the number of different ways that the outputs can be raised (while obeying monotonicity). It
follows that, for partial orders of height h, the communication complexity of the two-party problem is Ω(nh log n)
bits, and this lower bound applies to any distributed algorithm.
3.3. Complexity of computing the dependencies
We have so far assumed that each node knows the other nodes that its function depends on. Here we look at how
difficult this may be. If the function fi depends on all its variables then building the dependency graph is easy. For
arbitrary boolean functions, the following simple theorem shows that computing dependencies is not likely to be
efficient. Define the problem DEPENDENCY: given a boolean function f on n variables x1, . . . , xn and an integer
1 ≤ k ≤ n, does f depend on the variable xk?
Theorem 10. The problem DEPENDENCY is NP-complete.
Proof. We first note that the problem is in NP since if f depends on xk this can be verified by nondeterministically
guessing an assignment X = x1, . . . , xn such that f (x1, . . . , xk, . . . , xn) 6= f (x1, . . . , xk, . . . , xn). We can prove
NP-hardness by reduction from VALIDITY: a function f is valid iff f (0, . . . , 0) = 1, and f depends on none of its
variables. Deciding the validity of f is known to be NP-hard [16] and so deciding dependency is NP-complete. 
Remarks. We note that if the function f is monotone then we can solve the DEPENDENCY problem in polynomial
time using the Quine–McCluskey algorithm [17]. Since we are considering systems containing only monotone policy
functions, computing the dependencies is therefore not a problem.
4. Approximation techniques
In this section, we present two novel techniques for safe approximation of a component in the global trust state.
Consider a situation in which a client principal p wants to access a resource controlled by server v. Assume that the
access control policy of v is that, to allow access, its trust in p should be trustwise above some threshold t0 ∈ X , i.e.,
the fixed point should satisfy t0  (lfpΠλ)(v)(p). The goal of the approximation techniques is to allow the server
to (soundly) make its security decision without having to actually compute the exact fixed point value. Instead, the
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server is able to efficiently compute a global trust state p¯ : P → P → X , which approximates the actual global trust
state in the following sense. If the server was to grant some security property to the client in the trust state p¯ then it
would also grant the same property in the actual global trust state.
We begin by giving some preliminary definitions. By x ≺ C we mean that for all y ∈ C, x ≺ y. Let T = (X,,v)
be a trust structure, i.e. having an information ordering (X,v) with a bottom element ⊥v and a trust ordering (X,)
with a bottom element⊥. Let C = {xi ∈ X | i ∈ N} be av-chain.5 The ordering isv-continuous if for any x ∈ X
we have (i) x  C implies x  ⊔C and (ii) C  x implies⊔C  x (i.e. if an element is less than all the elements
of a v-chain then it is also less than its limit). We shall require continuity in the case of infinite height orderings, for
example where the trust values are natural numbers.
4.1. Bounding “bad behaviour”
The first technique we present lets a client convince a server that, in the global trust state, the trust value it assigns
to the client is above a certain trust value (wrt the trust ordering). The technique is based on the following proposition.
Proposition 11. Let (X,,v) be a trust structure in which  is v-continuous. Let p¯ ∈ Xn , and F : Xn → Xn be
any function that is v-continuous and -monotonic. If we have p¯  (λk ∈ {1, . . . , n}.⊥v) and p¯  F( p¯ ), then
p¯  lfpv F.
Proof. We have p¯  λk.⊥v, which implies F( p¯)  F(λk.⊥v) by -monotonicity. Since p¯  F( p¯), transitivity
implies that p¯  F( p¯)  F(λk.⊥v). So again by -monotonicity of F and transitivity
p¯  F( p¯)  F2( p¯)  F2(λk.⊥v).
Now since for all i ≥ 0 we have p¯  F i (λk.⊥v), the fact that  is v-continuous implies that
p¯ 
⊔
i
F i (λk.⊥v) = lfpvF. 
Note that the conclusion of the proposition is an assertion that is useful for authorization; if the server knows a p¯ ∈ Xn
that is sufficient to allow an authorization, and also knows that p¯  lfpv F then it should allow the authorization, since
the global trust state of the system is higher in the trust ordering than the state p¯. Since the server does not need to
explicitly compute lfpv F , this idea is the basis of an efficient protocol for a kind of “proof carrying” authorization
(furthermore, it may be impossible to compute the actual trust state if the lattice has infinite height).
Consider for simplicity the “MN” trust structure TMN from Section 1, which satisfies the information continuity
requirement. Recall that, in this structure, trust values are pairs (m, n) of natural numbers, representing m + n past
interactions; m of which where classified ‘good’, and n, classified as ‘bad’.
Suppose principal p wants to efficiently convince principal v, that v’s trust value for p is a pair (m, n) with the
property that n is less than some fixed bound N ∈ N (i.e., giving v an upper bound on the amount of recorded “bad
behaviour” of p). Let us assume that v’s trust policy piv is monotonic, also with respect to , and that it depends on a
large set S of principals. Assume also that it is sufficient that principals a and b in S have a reasonably “good” trust
value for p, to ensure that v’s trust value for p is not too “bad”. An example policy with this property could be written
in the language of Carbone et al. [8] as
piv ≡ λx : P.(paq(x) ∧ pbq(x)) ∨
∧
s∈S\{a,b}
psq(x).
The construct p·q represents policy reference or delegation, e.g., if a and x are principal identities then expression
paq(x) “evaluates” to the value that a’s trust policy specifies for x . The construct e ∨ e′ represents least upper bound
in the trust ordering (intuitively, “trustwise maximum” of e and e′), and similarly ∧ represents greatest lower bound
(“trustwise minimum”).6 Thus, informally, the above policy says that any principal p should have “high trust” with
5 A v-chain is a subset of elements from a partial order, where the elements in the chain are totally ordered by v.
6 The example policy assumes that (X,) is a lattice, meaning that for any x, y ∈ X both x ∨ y and x ∧ y exist. Furthermore operations ∨ and
∧ must be continuous also with respect to the information ordering. In many trust structures this is often the case [8].
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a and b, or, with all of s ∈ S \ {a, b}, for the v to assign “high trust” to p. Now, if p knows that it has previously
performed well with a and b, and knows also that v depends on a and b in this way, it can engage in the following
protocol.
Protocol. Principal p sends to v the “trust state”
t = [(v, p) 7→ (0, N ), (a, p) 7→ (0, Na), (b, p) 7→ (0, Nb)]
which can be thought of as a “proof” stating that (0, N )  (lfpΠλ)(v)(p). Upon reception, v first extends t to a global
trust state, which is the extension of t to a function p¯ of type P → P → TMN , given by
p¯ = λx ∈ Pλy ∈ P.

(0, N ) if x = v and y = p
(0, Na) if x = a and y = p
(0, Nb) if x = b and y = p
(0,∞) otherwise.
To check the proof, principal v must verify that p¯ satisfies the conditions of Proposition 11. First, v must check
that p¯(x)(y)  ⊥v = (0, 0) for all x, y. But this holds trivially if y 6= p or x 6= v, a, b because then
p¯(x)(y) = (0,∞) = ⊥. For the other few entries it is simply an order-theoretic comparison p¯(x)(y)  (0, 0).
Now v tries to verify that p¯  Πλ( p¯ ). To do this, v verifies that (0, N )  piv( p¯ )(p). If this holds then v sends the
value t to a and b, and ask a and b to perform a similar verification (e.g. (0, Na)  pia( p¯ )(p)). Then a and b reply
with ‘yes’ if this holds and ‘no’ otherwise. If both a and b reply ‘yes’, then v is sure that p¯  Π ( p¯): by the checks
made by v, a and b, we have that p¯(x)(y)  Πλ( p¯ )(x)(y) holds for pairs (x, y) = (v, p), (a, p), (b, p), but for all
other pairs it holds trivially since p¯ is the -bottom on these. By Proposition 11, we have p¯  lfp Πλ, and so, v is
ensured that its trust value for p is  greater than (0, N ).
We have illustrated the main idea of the protocol by way of an example, but the general technique for verifying a
proof should be clear. In general, the proof p¯ may include a larger number of principals, which would then have to be
involved in the verification process.
Remarks. Our approximation protocol has very much the flavour of a proof carrying authorization: the requester (or
prover) must provide a proof that its request should be granted. It is then the job of the service provider (or verifier) to
check that the proof is correct. The strength of this protocol lies in replacing an entire fixed point computation with a
few local checks made by the verifier, together with a few checks made by a subset of the principals that the verifier
depends on. An interesting property of this protocol is that part of the information that the prover needs to supply
should already be known to the prover; it should already know with whom it has performed well with in the past (e.g.
in our example above, p could know the bounds Na and Nb because of its previous interaction with a and b).
There are two important restrictions imposed by this approach. First, in order to construct its proof, the prover needs
information about the verifier’s trust policy and of the policies of those whom the verifier depends on. If policies are
secret or not publicly disclosed, it is not clear that the verifier would be able to construct the required proof. Secondly,
because of the requirement in Proposition 11 that p¯  ⊥v, the protocol can usually only be used to prove that the trust
in the client represents “not too much bad behaviour,” and not properties guaranteeing “sufficiently good” behaviour.
Later, we present a more general protocol that helps to remove some of these restrictions.
Notice that the protocol for exploiting Proposition 11 has a message complexity that is independent of the height
of the cpo; in particular, it works also for infinite height cpos. In contrast, the algorithm for computing the least fixed
point has message complexity linear in h in the worst case.
4.2. The complexity of constructing short proofs
Let the size of a proof in the previous protocol be the number of principals involved in the proof carrying request
(and hence the verification protocol). Even if the prover p knows all the local policies, the following theorem shows
that there is unlikely to be an efficient procedure to construct small proofs in all cases.
Theorem 12. For a network of mbfs, it is NP-hard to approximate to within any constant factor the minimum size of
an assignment X where X ≤ F∗ and X (v) = 1.
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Proof. Wewill consider an easier problem: imagine that there is an oracle that answers questions of the form X ≤ F∗,
for any assignment X . We construct a very simple reduction from the following NP-complete problem:
MONOTONE MINIMUM SATISFYING ASSIGNMENT [16]: Given a monotone formula f (x1, . . . , xn) over the
basis {∨,∧}, a satisfying assignment is an assignment (v1, . . . , vn) such that f (v1, . . . , vn) = 1. What is the minimum
size of a satisfying assignment of f ?
Monotone minimum satisfying assignment is NP-hard to approximate within any constant factor, by reduction
from minimum hitting set. Now, given a monotone function g, build a network with nodes p,v and v1 . . . vn for the
variables in f . Set f p = v, fvi = 1 and fv = g. Then p has a proof that f ∗p = 1 of size k, iff g has a satisfying
assignment X of size k. Of course, v needs to check that X <= F(X) and X ≤ F∗, but the latter can be done with a
single call to the oracle.
Note that if X is a satisfying assignment of g = fv then X ≤ F(X) is satisfied: let X ′ be the extended state where
everything not in X gets 0. Then F(X ′)(v) = 1 since X ′ is a satisfying assignment for fv , and F(X ′)(vi ) = 1 for all
vi since they are just constants, and F(X ′)(p) = X ′(p). Hence F(X ′) ≥ X . Also, X ≤ F∗ is also trivial since there
is only one fixed point and it is just the evaluation of the function g(1, . . . , 1). 
It is not difficulty to show that there are networks where Ω(n) bits are required, since we can construct a set
of functions with 2n different satisfying assignments: for each subset S of {1, . . . , n}, S is a minimum satisfying
assignment of
fS =
∧
i∈S
xi .
Hence Ω(n) bits are required to describe a satisfying assignment of at least one function fS .
4.3. A proof carrying protocol using snapshots
In this section we present a new theorem that gives a different proof carrying protocol that requires more
communication, but does not have the two restrictions of the previous protocol.
The approximation technique developed in this section is different to the protocol in the previous subsection. In
particular, we do not require the prover (client) to provide any information. We show that if we can take a snapshot
of the system as it approaches the true fixed point from below (and hence satisfies some properties) then we can use
this to derive a suitable approximation for the correct trust value. Usefully, the snapshot can be obtained by essentially
‘pausing’ the asynchronous fixed point algorithm from Section 2.2 at some point. The verifiers (servers) are then
able to make a collection of local checks on this snapshot, allowing them to infer that the fixed point value must be
trustwise above the snapshot value. The technique is based on the following proposition.
Proposition 13. Let (X,,v) be a trust structure in which isv-continuous. Let t¯ ∈ Xn , and F : Xn → Xn be any
function that is v-continuous and -monotonic. Assume that t¯ is an information approximation for F. If t¯  F(t¯ )
then t¯  lfp F.
Proof. Since t¯ is an information approximation for F , we have by easy induction that for all k ∈ N, Fk(t¯) v
Fk+1(t¯) v lfp F , and so by continuity of F ,⊔k∈N Fk(t¯) = lfp F . Since t¯  F(t¯), an easy induction gives t¯  Fk(t¯)
for all k. Then the information continuity of  implies that t¯  lfp F . 
This proposition is very useful because, by Lemma 8, a global invariant in the asynchronous fixed point algorithm
is that all values computed are information approximations for F . This means that we can combine the algorithm with
a distributed protocol that checks the condition t¯  F(t¯ ) in the above proposition.
Imagine that during the execution of the asynchronous algorithm, there is a point in time in which no messages are
in transit, all nodes i have computed their function fi , and sent the value fi (i.m) to all that depend on it. Thus we have
a “consistent” state in the sense that for any node x and any node y ∈ N+(x) we have x .m[y] = y.tcur . In particular
if x and z both depend on y, then they agree on y’s value: x .m[y] = y.tcur = z.m[y]. In this ideal state, there is a
consistent vector t¯ which by Lemma 8, is an information approximation for F , i.e. t¯ contains the values t¯i = i.tcur for
nodes i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If the state of the system was frozen at this point and all nodes x simultaneously make the check
x .tcur  fx (x .m), then vector t¯ satisfies t¯  F(t¯ ). Since t¯ is an information approximation for F , by Proposition 13,
the root node R knows that t¯R  lfp FR , which is what we want.
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Process: non-root nodes i
||{A,B,C}
A : receive (init);
||{A1,A2}
A1: ||c∈i.S c : send (init) to c;
A2: [ //wait until consistent state];
i.tapp ← i.tcur ;
|| j∈N−(i) j : send (copy) to j ;
B : ||{B1,B2}
B1: ||k∈N+(i)
k : receive (copy) from k;
i.mapp[k] ← i.m[k];
B2: join {B1, A2} then
i.b : bool← (i.tapp  fi (i.mapp));
C : ||{C1,C2}
C1: ||c∈i.S
c : receive (i.bc : bool) from c;
C2: join {C1, B2} then
send (i.b ∧ (∧c∈i.S i.bc)) to i.p;
Fig. 3. Snapshot algorithm — Generic node behaviour.
We now describe how to obtain suitable snapshots from the distributed asynchronous fixed point algorithm (i.e.
where no messages are in transit and each nodes have computed their function for this step). Assume that the
asynchronous algorithm is running, and at some point the root node decides to run the approximation check, perhaps
because it has computed a (possibly non-fixed point) value R.tcur , which is sufficient to allow access. We assume that
each node i ∈ P has additional variables i.tapp : X and i.mapp : X array, indexed by N+(i). The array will eventually
store only consistent values. The algorithm, as usual, consists of a special process run by the root, and another similar
process running at non-root nodes, given by Fig. 3.
Assume that we have a spanning tree TR , rooted at R and each node knows the sets N+(i) and N−(i) as in
Section 2. The root initiates the approximation algorithm. It starts by sending an init message to each of its children,
stored in R.S (Fig. 3, label A1). Now it waits until it is in a locally consistent state (A2), which means that, in the
asynchronous algorithm, it has just computed R.tcur ← fR(R.m), and (if necessary) has sent that value to each of
N−(R). Once in such a state, R saves the value by doing R.tapp← R.tcur — this value will become the value of R in
the consistent vector we are seeking. R now sends a copy message to each node in N−(R) (A2). A node y ∈ N−(R)
that receives a copy message from R will copy the last value received from R into its approximation array, i.e.
y.mapp[R] ← y.m[R] (B1). Since we are assuming a reliable network, the copied value is R.tapp, and so we are
propagating consistent values. Root R now waits until each node z ∈ N+(R) has sent a copy message, and computes
R.tapp  fR(R.mapp) (B2). Finally, the root waits for all children in the spanning tree to have replied with a boolean
value, and if all of these are true and the check succeeded (C1, C2), then the root is ensured that R.tapp  (lfp F)R .
Non-root nodes i , once initiated, do almost the same. The only difference is that after the check has been made, and
all children in the spanning tree have replied with a boolean, i sends value true to its parent i.p only if all i’s children
sent true and i’s own check succeeded.
Since there is a constant number of messages sent for each edge in GR , the message complexity of the snapshot
algorithm is O(|E |) messages, each of size O(1) bits.
A useful property of this algorithm is that it can be run concurrently with the asynchronous fixed point algorithm;
there is no reason to stop! One may simply allocate a thread implementing the approximation check that runs
concurrently with the asynchronous fixed point algorithm.
Note that, the style of this protocol is different from that of the previous section. In the previous protocol the client
presents a “proof” t that the servers then verify. It is not clear how one could use Proposition 13 in this style. In
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particular, if a client presented a “proof” t , then it is not clear how a distributed algorithm could check that t v lfp F
without already knowing lfp F .
4.4. An example run
We illustrate the snapshot algorithm on the policies from Section 2.5. Again we illustrate the algorithm by a
sequence of network states. We assume that the asynchronous algorithm has been running for some time (as in
Section 2.5). Let us assume that R now wants to run the snapshot algorithm with respect to its current value, (2, 5).
Network snapshot 1. R initiates the algorithm by sending init messages to A and C. Concurrently it sends a copy
message to B to indicate that the last message received by B from R should be used for approximation. (Note
that it is not a problem that B receives the copy message before it is initiated.)
R.tcur = (2, 5)
m[A] = (1, 5)
m[C] = (2, 5)
R:init

R:init -- C.tcur = (2, 5)
m[D] = (0, 0)
D:(4,6)



A.tcur = (1, 5)
m[B] = (0, 0)
C:(3,0)
11
B.tcur = (3, 5)
m[R] = (2, 5)
R:copy
ee
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (0, 0)
C:(2,5)
JJ
Network snapshot 2. Here C has received message D : (4, 6). It then receives the R : init message. C proceeds
by sending its current value to R and D, followed by copy messages, and an init message (only) to D. A
behaves similarly.
R.tcur = (2, 5)
m[A] = (1, 5)
m[C] = (2, 5)A:(3,5);
A:copy

C:=(4,6);C:copy
-- C.tcur = (4, 6)
m[D] = (4, 6)
C:init



A.tcur = (3, 5)
m[B] = (3, 0) A:init 11
B.tcur = (3, 5)
mapp[R] = (2, 5)
ff
D.tcur = (4, 6)
m[C] = (2, 5)
C:copy;
C:(4,6)
JJ
Network snapshot 3. Here D has asserted that D.tcur  piD(D.mapp) is true. Since it has no children in the spanning
tree, it immediately sends value true to its (spanning tree) parent C (illustrated by the dotted edges).
R.tcur = (2, 5)
mapp[A] = (3, 5)
mapp[C] = (4, 6)

-- C.tcur = (4, 6)
m[D] = (4, 6)
D:copy;
D:true



A.tcur = (3, 5)
m[B] = (3, 0)
B:(3,5);B:copy
11
B.tcur = (3, 5)
mapp[R] = (2, 5)
ee
D.tcur = (4, 6)
mapp[C] = (4, 6)
JJ
Network snapshot 4. B has made its assertion, and similarly, once C receives true from D, it makes assertion
C.tcur  piC(C.mapp), and sends true to R.
R.tcur = (2, 5)
m[A] = (3, 5)
m[C] = (4, 6)

C:true -- C.tcur = (4, 6)
mapp[D] = (4, 6)



A.tcur = (3, 5)
mapp[B] = (3, 5)
B:true
11
B.tcur = (3, 5)
mapp[R] = (2, 5)
ff
D.tcur = (4, 6)
mapp[C] = (4, 6)
JJ
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Network snapshot 5. Finally, A makes its assertion, and once R receives value true, R knows that (2, 5) 
lfp(Πλ)(R)(S) (recall that S is the subject of the trust computation).
R.tcur = (2, 5)
m[A] = (3, 5)
m[C] = (4, 6)
A:true

-- C.tcur = (4, 6)
mapp[D] = (4, 6)



A.tcur = (3, 5)
mapp[B] = (3, 5) 11
B.tcur = (3, 5)
mapp[R] = (2, 5)
ff
D.tcur = (4, 6)
mapp[C] = (4, 6)
JJ
4.5. Dual propositions and generalization
Note that both the propositions in this section have “dual” versions.
Proposition 14. Let (X,,v) be a trust structure in which  is v-continuous. Let p¯ ∈ Xn , and F : Xn → Xn be
any function that is v-continuous and -monotonic. If ⊥v  p¯ and F( p¯ )  p¯ then lfp F  p¯.
The dual of Proposition 13 is the following.
Proposition 15. Let (X,,v) be a trust structure in which isv-continuous. Let t¯ ∈ Xn , and F : Xn → Xn be any
function that is v-continuous and -monotonic. Assume that t¯ is an information approximation for F. If F(t¯ )  t¯
then lfp F  t¯ .
We can deploy similar algorithms for the duals. At first sight Proposition 14 does not seem as useful as its dual.
The conclusion lfp F  p¯ can usually only be used to deny a request, and a prover in the protocol for Proposition 14
would probably not be interested in supplying information which would help in refuting its request. However, this
is not always so. For example, suppose one is using trust structures conveying probabilistic information (e.g. [18,
11]), and that p¯  p¯′ expresses (informally) that, when interacting with a certain principal, the probability of a
specific outcome given p¯, is lower than the probability of that outcome given p¯′. In this case, an assertion of the form
lfp F  p¯, can convince the verifier that when interacting with the prover, the probability of a “bad” outcome is below
a certain threshold.
Essentially, we can use the same algorithm as that of Section 4.3 for exploiting Proposition 15. Servers can
incorporate the check F(t¯ )  t¯ together with the dual check t¯  F(t¯ ).
4.6. A more general class of proof carrying protocols
Interestingly, it turns out that the two propositions of this section are actually instances of a more general theorem,
which gives rise to a generalized approximation protocol, that can be seen as a combination of the two techniques
presented in this section.
Proposition 16. Let (X,,v) be a trust structure in which  is v-continuous. Let p¯ ∈ Xn , and F : Xn → Xn be
any function that is v-continuous and -monotonic. Assume that p¯ satisfies p¯  F( p¯). If there exists an information
approximation t¯ ∈ Xn for F, with property that p¯  t¯ , then p¯  lfp F.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 16 is similar to that of Proposition 11. We use the diagram:
p¯  F( p¯)  . . .  F i ( p¯)  . . .
   . . .
t¯ v F(t¯) v . . . v F i (t¯) v . . .
By the continuity of  we have p¯ ⊔i F i (t¯). 
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Note that one obtains Proposition 11 with the trivial information approximation t¯ = ⊥v, and Proposition 13 by
taking the proof to be the approximation, i.e. p¯ = t¯ .
In fact, this proposition can be used for a protocol, which can be seen as a merger of the ideas of proof carrying
authorization and the snapshot protocol. The prover p sends a proof p¯ to the verifier v. The condition p¯  Π ( p¯) can
be checked in the same manner as in the proof carrying authorization protocol. Now v needs to assert the existence of
an information approximation t¯ , with p¯  t¯ . This can be done by running the asynchronous algorithm until property
t¯i  p¯i is satisfied locally at each node i , which can be checked in a manner similar to that in the snapshot algorithm
for Proposition 13. This protocol is analogous to that in Section 4.1 without the restriction p¯  ⊥v, but requiring
more work for the verifiers to check the proof (in the worst case they must compute their local fixed point values).
We note finally that the v-continuity property, required of  in our propositions, is satisfied for all interesting trust
structures we are aware of: Theorem 3 of Carbone et al. [8] implies that the information continuity condition is satisfied
for all interval-constructed structures. Furthermore, their Theorem 1 ensures that interval-constructed structures are
complete lattices with respect to  (thus ensuring the existence of ⊥). Several natural examples of non-interval
domains can also be seen to have the required properties [10]. The requirement that all policies pip are monotonic
also with respect to  is not unrealistic. Intuitively, it amounts to saying that if everyone raises their trust levels in
everyone, then policies should not assign lower trust levels to anyone.
5. Lower bounds for proof carrying requests
In the previous section we presented two simple proof carrying request protocols that allow a prover p to convince
a verifier v of a property of the global trust state, i.e. a component of the least fixed point corresponding to v’s trust in
p. We now consider the complexity of such a proof carrying request model.
We will assume the abstract model used for the lower bounds in Section 3, with the following addition. There is a
prover p who knows all the policies f1, . . . , fn , and some verifier v who wishes to be convinced of f ∗v . Crucially, v
does not trust what p says. One thing p can do is to send the entire state f ∗1 , . . . , f ∗n to v (with the implicit claim that
this is indeed the lfp), and then v can ask the other nodes to check that this is indeed a fixed point, as in the information
approximation protocol. But this only convinces v that f ∗1 , . . . , f ∗n is a component of some fixed point; how is v to
know that this is the least fixed point?
Clearly two desirable properties of any such proof carrying protocol are that small proofs can be efficiently
generated by the prover, and the verifier can efficiently verify or reject such a proof. Whether such a protocol exists
depends on our definitions of ‘small’ and ‘efficient’, and in addition whether we allow the verifier to be convinced
with some small probability of error. In this section we use the results of Section 3 to show that any proof carrying
request must require communication linear in the height of the partial order for the verifier to verify it.
5.1. Nondeterministic communication complexity
To be able to utilise our results from Section 3, we shall need some terminology from nondeterministic
communication complexity [15]. Just as NP refers to the languages solvable in nondeterministic polynomial time,
there is an analogue in communication problems. For this purpose, we consider communication complexity of
polylogarithmic in n to be ‘efficient’, as opposed to polynomial in the case of computational problems. We can then
define a set of analogous complexity classes.
In particular, the class NPcc is the set of functions where, for two players Alice and Bob, Bob can guess Alice’s
input x and they can then efficiently verify that f (x, y) = 1. Similarly, the functions in co− NPcc are those where a
guess that f (x, y) = 0 is efficiently verifiable. The following definition relates nondeterministic complexity with the
communication required in a proof and is crucial.
Definition 17 (Nondeterministic Commmunication Complexity [15]). The nondeterministic communication com-
plexity N ( f ) of a boolean function f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is the total amount of communication involved in
proving and verifying f (x, y) in the most efficient proof system, where the verifier is to be convinced with certainty.
We shall also make use of the following known result.
Lemma 18 ([15]). DI SJ ∈ co− NPcc and DI SJ 6∈ NPcc.
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The lemma implies that there exist proofs of non-disjointness for two sets which require small total communication
(p sends to v, say Alice, an element x ∈ P ∩ Q then Alice asks Bob if x ∈ Q), but that there are no small proofs of
disjointness. More details about communication complexity can be found in the book [15].
5.2. Proof carrying requests for the least fixed point
Recall that the proof of the lower bound in Section 3 for computing a component of the least fixed point used a
reduction from the set-disjointness function. By the above lemmas it immediately follows that for partial orders of
height h, any proof of f ∗v must use at least Ω(hn log n) bits of communication. Hence the proof itself must be at least
this large.
Recall that in the lower bound, the two sets are disjoint iff the least fixed point has g∗0 = >. Since the disjointness
function is not in NPcc, proving that some node v has f ∗v = > is not efficient, but since it is in co− NPcc there may
exist short proofs that f ∗v v >.
Recall the approximation theorem of the previous section: if t  ⊥v then there exist proofs of size almost
independent (logarithmic) in the height h of the partial order. However, for arbitrary t , the above theorem shows
that some proofs must use communication at least linear in h, in the worst case. This appears to suggest an interesting
tradeoff between the size of a proof and the height in the partial order of the state being proved. Intuitively, this is
because v cannot be efficiently convinced that there are no fixed points smaller than some given one.
Note that, although the original lower bound of Section 3 applies to both randomized and deterministic
computation, the proof carrying result only applies to deterministic computation (and the algorithms we presented
were also deterministic). It is interesting to ask whether we can produce an efficient randomized proof carrying request
protocol.
6. Discussion
We have shown that it is possible to compute local fixed points in the trust structure framework using a totally
asynchronous distributed algorithm, and proved its correctness. We also extended the notion of proof carrying requests
by giving a theorem that can be parameterized to give various different protocols, each with different restrictions on
the range of trust values they can ‘prove’ and with differing complexities.
Our negative results show that this range of complexities is inherent to any proof carrying request protocol. The
original proof carrying protocol presented in [8] requires an amount of communication almost independent of the
number of trust levels but can only be used to prove a limited range of trust values. On the other hand, we show that
in the worst case, a general proof carrying protocol may require approximately as much communication as computing
the trust value ‘from scratch.’
The implication of our negative results is that it may be necessary to restrict the policy language in order to
efficiently implement the trust model in a distributed network. We have been unable to obtain interesting results in
this area but it remains an interesting area for future work.
Finally, we presented the distributed algorithm and the lower bounds in a general model that may allow them to be
applied to other problems involving fixed points in a distributed network of policies, for example policy-based routing
schemes [19].
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